Distinguishing Between Direct and Derivative Shareholder Suits by Editors,
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN DIRECT AND
DERIVATI-VTE SHAREHOLDER SUITS
Ownership of shares of stock in a corporation gives rise to certain
legal rights,' for example, the right to inspect the corporate books and
records in good faith and at reasonable times.2 If a shareholder is denied
this right, he may sue the corporation to compel its directors to permit him
to examine the books.3 Such a suit is dearly a "direct action," that is, a
suit by the shareholder in his own right to redress an injury sustained
directly by him for which he is entitled to personal relief 4 On the other
hand, if a director converts corporate assets, the corporation is injured
directly, while the shareholders suffer only indirectly through a decrease in
the book value of their stock. The corporation may sue and recover its
misappropriated assets, 5 and its recovery will also repair the shareholders'
indirect injury. If the corporation is unwilling to sue, however, a share-
holder may be able to "instigate" a suit to enforce the corporate cause of
action; 6 any amount recovered will not go directly to the plaintiff-share-
holder but will be added to the assets of the corporation.7 Such a suit on
behalf of the corporation is clearly a "derivative suit." 8 But between the
definitive poles of the direct action to reify a shareholder's right of inspec-
tion and the derivative suit to recover lost corporate assets lies a blurred
area where, because both the shareholder and the corporation have been
significantly injured, it becomes difficult to distinguish between a "personal
right" and a "corporate cause of action." In order to arrive at a sensible
distinction in this hazy area, it is necessary to examine the doctrinal basis
for derivative suits, the motivating policy considerations, and the legal
incidents which follow from characterizing a particular cause of action
"direct" or "derivative."
1 See 13 Fr.TcHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5717 (rev. ed. 1961).
:2 Kahn v. American Cone & Pretzel Co., 365 Pa. 161, 74 A.2d 160 (1950) ; see
Ruby v. Penn Fibre Bd. Corp., 326 Pa. 582, 585, 192 Atl. 914, 916 (1937) ; PA. STAT.
ANNi,. fit. 15, § 2852-308 (1958).
3 Kahn v. American Cone & Pretzel Co., supra note 2.
4 See Rogers v. American Tobacco Co., 143 Misc. 306, 257 N.Y. Supp. 321
(Sup. Ct), aff'd inern., 233 App. Div. 708, 249 N.Y. Supp. 993 (1931).
5 See Anderson v. Derrick, 220 Cal. 770, 32 P.2d 1078 (1934) ; Grimes v. Brain-
mer, 214 Iowa 405, 239 N.W. 550 (1931); Hirshberg v. Appel, 266 Mass. 98, 164
N.E. 915 (1929).
0The shareholder must allege a demand on the directors to sue, or show suffi-
dent reason for not making such a demand. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450
(1882) ; Bartlett v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 221 Mass. 530, 109 N.E. 452 (1915) ;
Glenn v. Kittanning Brewing Co., 259 Pa. 510, 518, 103 At. 340, 342-43 (1918).
Some jurisdictions also require a demand on the shareholders. See Pomerantz v.
Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 344 (D. Mass. 1951); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont,
206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
7 See Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 230 F.2d 717, 720 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Liken v.
Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 441 (N.D. Iowa 1946). But cf. Perlman v. Feldmann,
219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
8 See Liken v. Shaffer, supra note 7.
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I. A PoLicY APPROACH
A stock certificate represents the shareholder's pro rata interest in the
net assets of the corporation, and any injury to the corporation is im-
mediately reflected by a diminution in that interest. Nevertheless, the
corporation and its shareholders are legally separate and distinct.9 "[I]t
leads nowhere to call a corporation a fiction. If it is a fiction it is a fiction
created by law with intent that it should be acted on as if true. The
corporation is a person and its ownership is a nonconductor that makes it
impossible to attribute an interest in its property to its members." 0  Re-
gard for the corporate personality demands that suits to redress corporate
injuries which secondarily harm all shareholders alike be brought only by
the corporation." That a shareholder may be precluded from bringing a
direct action for damages to his ownership interest was first established in
Smith v. Hurd,12 in which it was held that when a corporation is injured
through the negligence of its directors, a cause of action exists only in
favor of the corporation, even though the shareholders are also injured.
Underlying this refusal to pierce the corporate veil are policy considerations
which justify and support the integrity of the corporate entity. Above all,
a corporate recovery restores the fund out of which creditors of the corpo-
ration are to be paid.' 3 In addition, one corporate action avoids the multi-
plicity of suits which might otherwise be brought by individual share-
holders.14 Payment into the corporate treasury rather than into share-
holder pockets benefits all shareholders equally and enables the corporation
to continue to provide an investment channel for their risk capital. To per-
mit proportionate individual recovery for damages to the corporation would
in effect be a judicial determination to distribute corporate assets either as
a dividend or in partial liquidation. Such a distribution might be an
invasion of directors' discretion 15 or invalid 16q.as a dividend, in terms of
a balance sheet surplus standard 1 or a net profits test,'8 or in partial
liquidation, if such distribution would have required shareholder ratification
or if no fund existed out of which such distribution could lawfully be
9 Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371, 384-85 (1847).
I0 Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930) (Holmes, I.).
11 See Grimes v. Brammer, 214 Iowa 405, 239 N.W. 550 (1931) ; Smith v. Hurd,
53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371 (1847).
12 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371 (1847).
13 Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1956) (dictum); Knapp v.
Bankers Sec. Corp., 230 F.2d 717, 720 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp.
432, 441 (N.D. Iowa 1946); Niles v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 176 N.Y. 119,
122-23, 68 N.E. 142, 143-44 (1903).
14 See, e.g., Watson v. Button, supra note 13, at 237 (dictum).
15 See Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 230 F.2d 717, 720 (3d Cir. 1956); Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 500-02, 170 N.W. 668, 682 (1919); Gordon v.
Elliman, 306 N.Y. 456, 459, 119 N.E.2d 331, 334 (1954).
16 See Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 251, 2 A.2d 904, 911 (Sup. Ct.
1938).
-7E.g., N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW § 58.
18 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:8-19 (1939).
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made.' Thus, to determine whether a particular claim for relief should
be enforced through a direct action or derivatively, it must be ascertained
whether the situation in question calls for the maintenance of the corporate
personality to protect creditors, to avoid multiple suits, or to continue
corporate control over the disposition of invested capital.
Characterization of an action as direct or derivative carries with it
legal incidents which implement these policy considerations and which
highlight the competing interests involved. If a suit is characterized as
derivative, any amount recovered belongs to the corporation 20 and is
thereby made subject to the claims of creditors. Such a characterization
may eliminate multiple litigation in two ways: a successful defense will
enable the defendant to interpose a res judicata bar to all other derivative
suits on the same cause of action,21 and "strike suits" may be discouraged
in those jurisdictions having security-for-expenses legislation.
22 If plaintiff
chooses to post the required security, derivative-suit characterization may
ultimately cause him to indemnify the defendants for their litigation ex-
penses and counsel fees. 3  When a suit is characterized as direct, the
amount recovered goes straight to the shareholder; 24 therefore, the share-
holder would especially prefer direct-action characterization when any cor-
porate recovery would be certain to pass immediately to creditors or when
the alleged wrongdoer, although able to satisfy a judgment in an amount
due one shareholder, would be unable to satisfy the entire corporate claim.
A direct-action characterization might also be sought either because the
plaintiff is no longer a shareholder in the corporation-hence, unable to
maintain or benefit from a derivative suit--or because the corporation
itself no longer exists. Where a shareholder is unable or chooses not to
meet the costs imposed by an applicable security-for-expenses statute,25 he
would be compelled either to seek a direct-action characterization or to
forego his litigation. In addition, a derivative-suit characterization may
mean that the corporation would be an indispensable party to the action; 26
if jurisdiction over the corporation could not be obtained, the shareholder
would be forced to seek a direct-action characterization or bring a deriva-
tive suit in federal court under the nationwide-service provision.27 Absent
19 See BAXmE & CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPOaTIONS 1239 (3d ed.
1959).20 See cases cited note 7 supra.
21 Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 443-44 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
2 2 E.g., N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAw § 61-b. See generally BA= & CARY, op. cit.
supra note 19, at 678.
23 E.g., N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 63-66.
24 See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 99 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
25 See Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLum.
L. Rzv. 1, 3, 5, 31 (1947).2 6 See, e.g., Keeler v. Schulte, 47 Cal. 2d 801, 306 P.2d 430 (1957); Carruthers
v. Jack Waite Mining Co., 306 N.Y. 136, 116 N.E.2d 286 (1953) (dictum); 13
FLET HER, PRIvATE CORPORATIONS § 5997 (rev. ed. 1961).
2728 U.S.C. § 1695 (1958); see Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957). See
generally Kessler, Corporations and the New Federal Diversity Statute: A Denial
of Justice, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 238; Weiner, Jurisdiction Over the Beneficiary Cor-
poration in Stockholders' Suits, 22 VA. L. REv. 153 (1935) ; Note, 44 YALE L.J. 1091
(1935).
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such circumstances which make a direct recovery desirable, a shareholder
would benefit from a derivative-suit characterization which would place the
proceeds of suit under corporate control as a continuing investment and
would enable him, if successful, to recoup his counsel fees
2 8
In any event, to determine the proper characterization of a share-
holder's suit, a court should evaluate the particular competing interests of
the plaintiff shareholder, the alleged wrongdoer, and the corporate creditors
in terms of the policy considerations and their concomitant legal incidents.
II. THE POLICIES IN CONTEXT
A. Compelling Declaration of Dividends
While it is agreed that a suit to compel payment of a declared dividend
is a direct action to enforce the "creditor"-shareholder's claim, 9 there is
a division of authority as to proper characterization of a suit to compel
declaration of a dividend.30 Nondeclaration of dividends, if unjustified,
injures the shareholders by constricting or postponing the return on their
investment; the corporation is injured by having a dividend policy that
fails to attract new capital. In Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp.,31 it was held
that since dividends are an incident of stock ownership and any improper
refusal to declare them results in a distinct injury to the shareholder, a
suit to compel declaration is a direct action. In support of such a char-
acterization it has been noted that the corporation is enriched rather than
harmed by a retention of corporate assets.3 2 But in Knapp one of the
grounds of complaint was that nondeclaration of dividends would subject
the corporation to a surtax 33 so that instead of being enriched by the
retention, the corporation would only be transferring funds to the govern-
ment rather than distributing them to its shareholders.
In a suit to compel declaration of a dividend, a court will grant relief
only if there is a fund lawfully available. 34 Corporate creditors would be
unaffected by a direct-action characterization, even if the declaration would
result in an impairment of the capital cushion under some variation of the
net profits test, since any distribution ordered will be in accord with the
dividend law of the jurisdiction in question which presumably has taken
into account the creditors' interest. A multiplicity of suits to compel dec-
2 8 See Neuberger v. Barrett, 180 Misc. 222, 223, 39 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576-77 (Sup.
Ct. 1942) ; BAtER & CARY, op. cit. supra note 19, at 717.
29 See, e.g., Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Kingsbury, 175 F.2d 983 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 900 (1949).
30 Compare Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956), with
Gordon v. Elliman, 306 N.Y. 456, 119 N.E.2d 331 (1954).
31 230 F2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956). Contra, Gordon v. Ellinman, supra note 30.
32 Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 230 F.2d 717, 722 (3d Cir. 1956).
33ld. at 719; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 531.
34 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) (by im-
plication) ; Gordon v. Elliman, 306 N.Y. 456, 474, 119 N.E.2d 331, 343 (1954) (Fuld,
J., dissenting).
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laration of dividends is unlikely since the courts, reluctant to interfere with
directors' business judgment, have placed a heavy burden of proof upon
the plaintiff.3 5 In addition, even if the characterization issue is not raised,
the court is likely, in a successful suit, to provide for class distribution
rather than just individual relief.36 Therefore, the res judicata and secu-
rity-for-expenses protection of derivative-suit characterization is unneces-
sary; and since a suit to compel declaration imposes no personal liability
on directors, the diminished possibility of secret settlements makes almost
superfluous the prohibitive strictures of a security-for-expenses statute,
3 7
although in some cases, as in Knapp, a defendant-director may be a ma-
jority shareholder whose income tax liability would be greatly increased by
a dividend distribution,3 8 thus making him more amenable to a secret
settlement. Finally, there is no need for a derivative-suit label to keep the
amount recovered within the corporation's management since the very
purpose of the suit is to remove funds from corporate control. Thus, since
there is a built-in protection for creditors, an inherent curb on multiple
litigation, and an alleged need to withdraw funds from corporate manage-
ment, a direct-action characterization is proper for a suit, normally a class
suit, to compel declaration of dividends.
B. Breach of Covenant Not to Compete
It is generally accepted that the characterization of suits for breach
of contract depends primarily on the intention of the parties to the
contract.3 9 Although breach of a contract with a corporation usually gives
rise to a corporate cause of action,40 such a contract has sometimes been
interpreted as a third party beneficiary contract in favor of the shareholders
to permit them to maintain direct actions as the real parties in interest.
41
Conversely, a contract to which the corporation was not a party has some-
times been interpreted as a third party beneficiary contract in favor of the
corporation to be enforced derivatively and not directly. This result has
been reached in cases in which one shareholder, selling his shares to another,
has covenanted not to compete with the corporation for a stated period of
time; 4 since the agreement has usually not been explicit as to the cor-
35 See, e.g., Conviser v. Simpson, 122 F. Supp. 205 (D. Md. 1954) ; Gottfried v.
Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct 1947).
36 See BALLANTINE, CORPoATi0xs § 234 (rev. ed. 1946).
7 Gordon v. Elliman, 306 N.Y. 456, 479-80, 119 N.E.2d 331, 345-46 (1954)
(Fuld, J., dissenting).
3 8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301(c).
39 See, e.g., Marshfield Clinic v. Doege, 269 Wis. 519, 526, 69 N.W.2d 558, 562
(1955).
40 See Green v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 24 F.2d 378, 382 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 278 U.S. 602 (1928) ; Cullum v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 115 S.W.2d
1196 (Tex. Ct Civ. App. 1938).
41 See Fleming v. Reed, 77 N.J.L. 563, 72 At. 299 (Sup. Ct. 1909); Lovitt v.
Illinois Sur. Co., 88 Misc. 100, 150 N.Y. Supp. 609 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
42 See Olson v. Ostby, 178 Ill. App. 165 (1913); Marshfield Clinic v. Doege,
269 Wis. 519, 69 N.W.2d 558 (1955).
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poration's beneficiary status, the intention of the parties has had to be
presumed. Violation of a covenant not to compete would ordinarily de-
crease the volume of the corporation's business, thereby cutting into its
expected profits; it might ultimately lead to a capital impairment. Creditors
who had relied on the current and projected stability of the corporation
might be injured if any damages recovered in a suit for breach of the
covenant were not channelled into the corporate treasury. Although mul-
tiple litigation is no problem since a direct action could be brought only by
the purchasing shareholder or his assignees, derivative characterization is
needed to retain any amount recovered as a continuing investment with the
corporation and to vest in the corporation-and derivatively in all its share-
holders-the right to seek an injunction against further competition by
the defendant if the purchasing shareholder or his assignees do not sue.
Money damages and injunctive relief running to the corporation will tend
to preserve the market value of the stock as enhanced by the covenant;
the purchasing shareholder will be able to retrieve his consideration through
resale of the stock at its increased market price. Unless the contract
stipulates that the cause of action for breach of the covenant is in the
purchasing shareholder, the cause of action should usually be enforced by
a derivative suit.43
C. Decline in Market Value
In Coronado Dev. Corp. v. Millikin,44 a direct action was held to be
the only means to redress a decline in the market value of shares allegedly
caused by the dissemination of false information about the corporation's
financial position. However, a decline in market value will harm the cor-
poration should it seek new capital through a public issue of stock. More-
over, this diminished market value is often accompanied by a decrease in
book value which can be restored most appropriately by a corporate
derivative recovery. The corporation is also likely to be incidentally dam-
aged through an impaired credit rating.45 A direct-action characterization
in this situation involves a danger of multiple suits since all the share-
holders will be injured by the market decline. Damages recovered for the
decrease in market or book value, whichever is greater, should go to the
corporation to enable it to reestablish its economic standing with its
creditors and prospective shareholders; recovery by an individual share-
holder lacks this bolstering effect.
D. Stock Issued for Inadequate Consideration
Issuance of shares of stock for inadequate consideration-for a con-
sideration less than par or, if no-par, less than the stated value---deprives
4 3 But see Meyerson v. Franklin Knitting Mills, 185 App. Div. 458, 172 N.Y.
Supp. 773 (1918).
44 175 Misc. 1, 22 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1940), complaint dismissed for in-
suffcient allegation as to damages, 262 App. Div. 504, 30 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1941).
45 See id. at 6, 22 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
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the creditors of their proper cushion and can only be remedied by deriva-
tive suit against the directors to compel payment into the corporate
treasury4 6 Such payment will also serve to equalize the capital base
contributed by each class of shareholders, thereby returning those share-
holders who paid fully for their shares to the status quo ante. However,
when stock is issued for a consideration less than the market or book value
but above par or stated value, there is no capital impairment which would
harm creditors' interests. Further, since a solvent corporation has usually
not been permitted to recover the amount unpaid on shares issued as fully
paid,4 7 there would be no derivative cause of action in such circumstances.
If a plaintiff-shareholder's voting power is diluted by the issuance, thereby
violating possible preemptive rights, appropriate relief-restoration of vot-
ing power--can be obtained in a direct action.48 Thus, proper characteri-
zation in this area must ultimately depend on the nature of the injury
alleged and the relief sought 49
III. DIRECT RECOVERY IN SPECIAL SITUATIONS
A. The Special Duty Doctrine
The "special duty" doctrine first enunciated in Ritchie v. McMullen 50
provides that an act violating a special duty owed a shareholder, even
though also injuring the corporation, constitutes a wrong to that share-
holder enforceable in a direct action. 51 This special duty arises not from
the normal director-shareholder relationship but from pledgor-pledgee re-
lationships, 52 fiduciary relationships, 53 and contractual arrangements.5 4 In
Ritchie v. McMullen,55 since the shareholder had pledged his stock with
the directors as security for a loan, the requisite duty was found in a
pledgor-pledgee relationship. The pledgee-directors obtained a court order
for a judicial sale of the stock to satisfy the debts it secured. The pledgor-
shareholder, alleging that the directors misused their powers to depress
the value of the stock in order to force a sale and purchase it themselves,
46 See Bennett v. Brenil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 15, 99 A.2d 236, 241
(Ch. 1953) ; State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 244 Iowa 785, 56 N.W.2d 173 (1952);
Selman v. Allen, 121 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
47 See BA= & CARY, op. cit. supra note 19, at 794, 827.
48 See Ames v. Voit, 97 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on jurisdictional grounrds
snb norn. Ames v. Mengel Co., 190 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1951); Horwitz v. Balaban,
112 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Hammer v. Werner, 239 App. Div. 38, 265
N.Y. Supp. 172 (1933).
49 See Witherbee v. Bowles, 201 N.Y. 427, 431-32, 95 N.E. 27, 28 (1911).
5079 Fed. 522 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 168 U.S. 710 (1897).
51 But cf. Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371 (1847).
52 See Ritchie v. McMullen, 79 Fed. 522 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 168 U.S. 710
(1897); Kono v. Roeth, 237 App. Div. 252, 260 N.Y. Supp. 662 (1932); Cutler v.
Fitch, 231 App. Div. 8, 246 N.Y. Supp. 28 (1930).
53 See Blakeslee v. Sottile, 118 Misc. 513, 194 N.Y. Supp. 752 (Sup. Ct 1922).
54 See Meyerson v. Franklin Knitting Mills, 185 App. Div. 458, 172 N.Y. Supp.
773 (1918).
55 79 Fed. 522 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 168 U.S. 710 (1897).
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counterclaimed against the pledgee-directors to repair this loss. The court
held these allegations sufficient to support a direct action, probably because
the pledgor, who was obliged to sell his shares, could not maintain a de-
rivative suit 56 nor benefit from one brought by other shareholders. Pre-
sumably the corporation retained its cause of action 57 to protect creditors
and the remaining shareholders. In view of the directors' intentional mis-
management, multiple liability does not seem harsh, for the directors would
have been unjustly enriched had they fulfilled their alleged intention to
purchase the pledgor's stock at its depressed value. There is no threat
of multiple litigation in special-duty situations since the doctrine by its
very nature can be invoked only by those privy to a recognized relationship.
In cases similar to Ritchie, the courts have usually adopted direct-
action characterization only after finding intentional wrongdoing aimed at
a particular pledgor-shareholder. In Millikin v. McGarrah,58 another
pledge situation, the cause of action was held to be solely derivative because
the decrease in share value was caused by the pledgee-directors' negligence
unaccompanied by any intent to profit by acquiring the pledgor's stock.59
However, although the injured shareholder may be adequately protected
through restoration of his share value in a derivative suit, if he has been
forced to sell his shares, his only remedy lies in a direct action. His right
to redress should not necessarily be lost by reason of a lack of specific in-
tent on the part of the directors; nor are the directors' motives directly
relevant to the policy considerations which support the interposition of
the corporate entity.60
Some courts permit a shareholder who has not sold his shares, and
can still maintain a derivative suit, to recover directly for acts done by a
party who owed him a special duty.61 The injured shareholder thus can
reap a double recovery since he will also benefit from a derivative enforce-
ment of the corporate cause of action. It is doubtful whether the imposi-
tion of multiple liability on the directors with its concomitant windfall to
the injured shareholder is justifiable, notwithstanding its deterrent value.
B. The General Rubber Co. Doctrine
A plaintiff damaged solely by an injury to the corporation may not
necessarily be made whole by a derivative suit even though he is still a
shareholder. In General Rubber Co. v. Benedict,62 the plaintiff was a
parent corporation of a subsidiary which had been defrauded by one of
56 See id. at 533; Hanna v. Lyon, 179 N.Y. 107, 71 N.E. 778 (1904).
57 See Cutler v. Fitch, 231 App. Div. 8, 246 N.Y. Supp. 28 (1930).
58159 App. Div. 725, 144 N.Y. Supp. 964 (1913).
59 See Ritchie v. McMullen, 79 Fed. 522, 534 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 168 U.S.
710 (1897) (dictum).
60 Cf. Cutler v. Fitch, 231 App. Div. 8, 246 N.Y. Supp. 28 (1930) ; Blakeslee v.
Sottile, 118 Misc. 513, 194 N.Y. Supp. 752 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
61 See ibid.
62215 N.Y. 18, 109 N.E. 96 (1915).
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its officers. A director of the parent knew of the officer's intended mis-
appropriation, which would inevitably diminish the value of the parent's
stock, but failed to disclose it. The parent corporation sued this director
for negligent performance of his duties; the subsidiary had not yet sued
its own officer or the parent's director. Since in a derivative suit upon the
subsidiary's cause of action the officer might be judgment-proof or out-
side the jurisdiction, and the director might not be liable as a co-con-
spirator,63 the court permitted the parent to bring suit directly against its
director. The court pointed out, however, that if the parent corpora-
tion's loss could be entirely satisfied in a derivative suit, it would be able
to recover only nominal damages in its own suit in order to avoid the
unjustified profit of a double recovery. As an alternative to speculating
about the results of a derivative suit, it might be possible to stay the direct
action until decision in the derivative suit; however, this delay might be
fatal to the direct action because of unavailable witnesses, stale evidence,
and the like. Nevertheless, the core of the General Rubber Co. doctrine,
which permits both a direct and derivative cause of action but only one
recovery, should be used to alleviate the special duty doctrine's unduly
harsh result of permitting direct recovery even though the plaintiff, still a
shareholder in the injured corporation, may benefit from a derivative suit
as well.
C. Equitable Considerations and Fraud
Courts have also granted direct recovery for an act injurious to both
the corporation and the shareholder when overtones of fraud have been
present. In Von Au v. Magenheimer,64 corporate officers induced a share-
holder to sell his stock to them for less than its true worth by deliberately
exaggerating to him the corporation's financial difficulties caused by their
conversion of corporate assets without the shareholder's knowledge. In
a suit by the former shareholder a direct recovery was allowed apparently
on the basis of equitable considerations 65-because plaintiff had suffered
injury which a derivative suit could not redress-although this decision
could also have been based on a fraud theory; 60 some courts have treated
fraud as being a "breach of a special duty." 
67
Where a director or officer has induced a stock subscription with
intent to misappropriate the invested property, the defrauded investor, now
shareholder, has been permitted to bring a direct action to restore the
former value of his stock decreased by the misappropriation. 8 This di-
rect recovery has been rationalized on the theory that the misappropria-
6
3 Id. at 24, 109 N.E. at 98.
04 126 App. Div. 257, 110 N.Y. Supp. 629 (1908), aff'd mer., 196 N.Y. 510, 89
N.E. 1114 (1909).
65 See id. at 268, 110 N.Y. Supp. at 636-37.
66 Id. at 267, 110 N.Y. Supp. at 636.
6 7 See Vierling v. Baxter, 293 Pa. 52, 141 Atl. 728 (1928).
88 See Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp., 28 Cal. 2d 525, 170 P.2d 898 (1946);
Vierling v. Baxter, mipra note 67.
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tion which injured the corporation was merely the culmination of the
fraudulent act alleged by the shareholder which was actually perpetrated
at the time the shareholder was induced to invest.69  Absent fraudulent
intent at that time, any subsequent depletion of corporate assets would
not support a direct cause of action7t° Since the defrauded shareholder
could have maintained a derivative suit, it is questionable whether a direct
action should be allowed in view of the possibility of a double recovery.
71
Moreover, if the wrongdoers are able to satisfy only one judgment, a
shareholder's direct-action recovery prior to any derivative judgment
would benefit him at the expense of corporate cxeditors-if the corpora-
tion was insolvent after the fraud-and the other shareholders.
D. Nonexistence of the Corporate Entity
Corporations sometimes terminate without first suing upon their
causes of action.72  In some of these cases the destruction of the corporate
entity has been incident to an officers' plan to defraud the shareholders by
misappropriating corporate assets.73 Many states have enacted statutes
which revive the corporate entity to enforce derivative causes of action
which arose during its lifetime.7 4 In the absence of such statutes courts
have employed direct-action characterization to allow the wrong to be
redressed. The special duty doctrine has been invoked when warranted
by the facts,75 or the courts have held that upon the corporation's death
its rights passed to the shareholders on the theory that the misappro-
priated property was held by the corporation in trust for the actual owners,
the shareholders. 76 One court has even permitted a direct action where a
Statute 77 existed authorizing suit in the corporate name; 78 but there was
no danger of multiple litigation since the plaintiff and one of the defendants
were the only shareholders in the former corporation.79
69 See Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp., supra note 68, at 531-32, 170 P.2d
at 902.
'to See Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp., 28 Cal. 2d 525, 170 P.2d 898 (1946);
W. E. Hedger Transp. Corp. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 186 Misc. 758, 61 N.Y.S.2d
876 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd -mern., 270 App. Div. 912, 61 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1946).
71 But cf. General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 N.Y. 18, 109 N.E. 96 (1915).
72 See Backus v. Kirsch, 264 Mich. 73, 249 N.W. 469 (1933); Smyth v. Ken-
wood Land Co., 97 Ore. 19, 190 Pac. 962 (1920).
-3 See Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765 (8th Cir. 1906), cert.
denied, 229 U.S. 615 (1913); Kono v. Roeth, 237 App. Div. 252, 260 N.Y. Supp.
662 (1932).
*14 E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2852-1111(B) (1958).
75 See Kono v. Roeth, 237 App. Div. 252, 260 N.Y. Supp. 662 (1932).
76 See Gasque v. Ball, 65 Fla. 383, 62 So. 215 (1913) ; Smyth v. Kenwood Land
Co., 97 Ore. 19, 190 Pac. 962 (1920).
77 See CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-1 (1953).
78 Ward v. Graham-Jones Motor Co., 74 Colo. 145, 147, 219 Pac. 776, 777 (1923).
79 Ibid.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Distinguishing between direct and derivative shareholder suits is not
made easier by application of such question-begging phrases as "personal
right" and "corporate cause of action." Proper characterization can only
be effected by considering the possible results of each suit: an individual
recovery may leave corporate creditors with unsatisfied claims or deprive
shareholders of part of their investment; a derivative suit may be barred
by res judicata, may be prohibitive by reason of a security-for-expenses
statute, or may inadequately compensate shareholders for peculiar indi-
vidual injuries.
.B.
